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THE US NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 2005 
 AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ON MALAYSIA 
 
This article is written on the assumption that Malaysia---a major littoral state to 
the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea---may experience a delicate 
diplomatic situation resulting from the preemptive character of the US National 
Strategy for Maritime Security 2005---NSMS 2005---which could motivate 
rivalry, provoke conflict, and induce war in Southeast Asia.  The assumption is 
such because the US is now perceived to be using NSMS 2005 as its latest 
geopolitical tool to contain China, to safeguard its energy security geopolitics, 
and in anticipation of maritime-based resource war in the region.  The crux of 
this article, therefore, is based on the question how will Malaysia maintain its 
balanced relations toward the US and China in the context of this geopolitical 
framework.  As such, this article attempts to analyze the preemptive character of 
NSMS 2005, to ascertain the China Factor contained in it, and to examine the 
impacts and implications of this maritime strategy on Malaysia’s future relations 
with the US and China.  This analysis hopes to enlighten the Malaysian 
government on the geopolitical consequences of NSMS 2005 and to facilitate the 
Malaysian government with the appropriate insights on how to mitigate these 
consequences through foreign policy initiatives at the national, bilateral, and 
multilateral levels.   
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Introduction 
Malaysia is a small nation with geostrategic strength derived from its status as one 
of the states which control the Straits of Malacca the world’s most vital waterways for 
global energy trade and big powers’ naval fleet mobility in the maritime region of 
Southeast Asia.1  Additionally, Malaysia is the co-beneficiary to the vast amount of 
petroleum reserves2
                                                             
1 The strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca derives from a combination of geopolitical, economic, 
and military factors (Kovacs 2005:x). 
2 Malaysia’s oil reserves are the third highest in the Asia-Pacific region. Malaysia holds proven oil reserves 
of 4 billion barrels as of January 2009. Nearly all of Malaysia's oil comes from offshore fields. The 
continental shelf is divided into 3 producing basins: the Malay basin in the west and the Sarawak and Sabah 
basins in the east. Most of the country’s oil reserves are located in the Malay basin and tend to be of high 
quality.  At the same time, Malaysia is the world’s eighth largest holder of natural gas reserves and was the 
second largest exporter of liquefied natural gas after Qatar in 2007. Malaysia holds 83 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2009. While much of the country’s oil reserves are found 
off Peninsular Malaysia, much of the country’s natural gas production comes from Eastern Malaysia, 
offshore Sarawak and Sabah (The U.S. Energy Information Administration Report, September 2009).  
 in the South China Sea---also a critical sea-lane for energy 
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transportation from West Asia to East Asia, namely Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as 
allies of the United States (US), as well as China as the US major adversary in the 21st 
century.3  As such, the Straits of Malacca is the Southeast Asian focal entry point to the 
energy supply route from West Asia, while the South China Sea is the Southeast Asian 
strategic exit point to the energy supply destination in East Asia.4  Both waterways---in 
the east and west coast of Peninsular Malaysia---are also important to the mobilization of 
naval powers, especially by the US, in the Asia-Pacific region.5
Malaysia: The Main Artery to Global Petroleum Route 
in Southeast Asia
   
 
 
 
Map 1: Malaysia as the main artery to global petroleum route in Southeast Asia 
Thus, Malaysia is the main artery to the West Asia-East Asia energy supply and 
big powers’ naval mobility.  However, since the vast majority of the world’s energy trade 
                                                             
3 If controlling the seas is a direct reflection of the leverage and hierarchy of a country in the international 
community, then the South China Sea is the epicenter of an emerging maritime regime. Here, nation-states 
(regional and extra-regional), non-state actors and international governmental organizations attempt to 
determine the rules of maritime trade (Kang 2009:1). 
4 Southeast Asia is home to important sea-lanes and straits, including the Malacca Straits, one of the busiest 
waterways in the world. More than 50,000 vessels on international routes transit the Malacca Straits each 
year, which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. Tankers carrying oil from the Middle 
East to countries such as China and Japan, which rely on imported oil, are just some of the vessels passing 
through the straits each day (Liss 2007:1).  
5 Southeast Asia lies at the foot of China’s most strategically important region. It envelops China’s border 
from the most economically successful eastern coastal areas, to its poorer and vulnerable southwestern 
provinces. The region holds all the vital and viable passageways of energy transport to China from the 
Middle East, Africa and around the world, making it both a region of great significance for China’s security 
and a source of vulnerability (Zhang 2007:18). 
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is sea borne (Wesley 2007:5); as US control over energy supply routes will curtail the 
possibility of the rise of a strategic competitor (ibid:6); and China is the world’s single 
biggest consumer of imported petroleum since July 2010 (msnbc.msn.com. 20 July 
2010)6; Malaysia, therefore, is inevitably crucial and strategic to both the US and also 
China in the context of their 21st century’s geopolitics.7
As such, all the above are causing Malaysia to be susceptible to the impact of the 
US National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) being implemented since 2005 
because among its objectives are to deter “disruption to marine transportation and 
commerce systems”,
      
8
This article, therefore, is of the sole objective of seeking to examine the implications of NSMS 
2005 on Malaysia through analyses on the salient features and roles of NSMS 2005; the energy 
security geopolitics in NSMS 2005; the China Factor in NSMS 2005; and the major implications 
of these factors on Malaysia.  These analyses are important because NSMS 2005---perceived as a 
major instrument to the US grand strategy
 and to avoid attacks “on critical maritime infrastructure and key 
assets” all over the world, if those disruptions and attacks affect American citizens, assets 
and interests, or affect the citizens, assets and interests of the US allies.  This 
susceptibility becomes more serious because NSMS 2005 also provides preemptive 
functions to the US maritime forces to deter such disruptions or avoid such attacks, 
irrespective of whether these actions jeopardize the territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty of other countries, particularly maritime nations like Malaysia. 
 
 
Objectives 
9
                                                             
6 China has overtaken the United States as the world's largest consumer of energy, according to data from 
Paris-based International Energy Agency.  News reports citing data from the IEA said China consumed the 
equivalent of 2.25 billion tons of oil last year, slightly above U.S. consumption of 2.17 billion tons. The 
measure includes all types of energy: oil, nuclear energy, coal, natural gas and renewable energy sources. 
But, China's government rejected the IEA's statistics ((msnbc.msn.com. 20 July 2010). 
7 One of the most important national security challenges facing the United States in the early 21st century is 
hedging against the rise of a hostile, more openly confrontational, or expansionist People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) (Krepinevich et. al. 208: 25). 
8 Disruptions in global oil and gas flows would have a major repercussion on the world’s economy (Kovacs 
2005:viii). 
9 Grand strategy integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states’ ultimate objectives in 
the international system (Biddle 2005:1).  
 
 of containing China from Southeast Asia---could 
jeopardize Malaysia’s relations with the US and also China, since both nations are Malaysia’s 
major trading partners.   
This objective is explored based on the question of how will Malaysia balance its 
relations with the US and China in the event of a probable future US-China conflict resulting 
from implementation of NSMS 2005 in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regions.  It is also 
being pursued on the assumption that Malaysia, as littoral state to the Straits of Malacca and the 
South China Sea, may experience a delicate diplomatic situation resulting from consequences of 
the geopolitical impacts of NSMS 2005. 
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Graphic 1: NSMS 2005 and its implications on Malaysia 
 
Accordingly, this article is divided into five sub-topics.  First, it attempts to define the 
concept of maritime security in the context of NSMS 2005 and examines the salient features and 
roles of the strategy.  Second, it undertakes to analyze the NSMS 2005 in the context of the US 
energy security geopolitics towards China.  Third, it seeks to deliberate on the China Factor in the 
NSMS 2005.  Fourth, it will study the implications of all these factors on Malaysia.  Lastly, it 
summarizes its findings in the context of Malaysia’s national interests and national security.     
 
 
The US NSMS 2005  
The formulation and implementation of NSMS 2005 reflects the seriousness of the US to 
securing the global commons and maritime domains10
                                                             
10 The maritime domain is defined as all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering 
on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, 
people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances (NSMS 2005:1).  Maritime domain encompasses trade 
routes, communication links, and natural resources vital to the global economy and the well-being of 
people in the United States and around the world (The US International Outreach and Coordination 
Strategy for The National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005:1). 
 
 through the concept of maritime 
security.  But, the US left this concept ambiguously defined.  Banloi (2004) and Bateman 
(2007), however, described the basic features and scope of maritime security concept as 
follows: 
  
Maritime security is a broad concept that includes a panoply of notions such as maritime 
safety, port security, freedom of navigation, SLOC security, security from piracy attacks and 
armed robbery (Banloi 2004). 
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The concept of maritime security has a traditional meaning for navies and defense forces 
with their role of protecting the nation and its national interests against threats primarily of a 
military nature.  However, the concept of maritime security has expanded following 9/11. It 
is still about protecting national security but instead of overt threats from military forces, 
there is a new emphasis on asymmetric threats, including both maritime terrorism and piracy 
(Bateman 2007:80).  
 
As such, this article constructed a working definition of maritime security concept 
based on the features and roles of NSMS 2005 as follows: 
 
Maritime security is an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive administrative, legal, 
political, economic, commercial, military and defense initiatives aimed at achieving the 
following objectives---to preserve freedom of the seas; to facilitate freedom of navigation 
and commerce; to safeguard the maritime domain, including all maritime-related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances, and trade routes, 
communication links, and natural resources vital to the global economy and the well-being 
of people around the world; to address all maritime-related threats of sabotage, terrorism, 
piracy, as well as hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts; and to protect the resources of the 
ocean. 
 
This definition shows that maritime security of the 21st century, as being 
stipulated in the US NSMS 2005, is a broad security concept.  Additionally, this concept, 
although national in its nature, is also international in its objectives.  It is such because 
“the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the 
secure use of the world’s oceans” (NSMS 2005:1).  Hence, the US NSMS 2005 is a 
strategic instrument which facilitates the US naval forces to combat traditional and 
unconventional threats---perceived and real---to the maritime domains and global 
commons, including global terrorism; regional conflicts which might lead to the 
involvement of major powers; proliferation and smuggling of WMD and its related 
criminal acts; disruption to regional and global economies; and disruption to marine 
transportation and commerce systems (NSMS 2005).  
NSMS 2005 also has two specific preemptive functions.  Firstly, police the global 
commons by providing security to the world’s waterways.  Secondly, to protect the 
maritime domains by ensuring security at all ports as well as other related maritime 
facilities and key infrastructures.  These functions are to be executed in the context of 
providing security to American citizens, assets, and interests---nationally and 
internationally---when they are under threats in any global commons or maritime 
domains.  These functions also cover the security of citizens, interests and assets of US 
allies11
                                                             
11 The United States and its allies – including France – are especially vulnerable to maritime terrorist 
attacks because of their worldwide overseas presence (Sinai 2004:49).    
 
 all over the world.  These trans-border and preemptive functions of NSMS 2005 
are almost similar to the objectives of the US war on terror launch since late 2001, to 
combat terrorists, terrorist organizations, and modern terrorism, with the sole purpose of 
protecting American citizens, assets, and interests, nationally and internationally.  As 
such, NSMS 2005 is a preemptive strategy which can be applied to any maritime 
domains or global commons, irrespective of whether it could jeopardize the territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty of other nations.  Thus, putting its explicit functions 
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aside, NSMS 2005 is actually a strategy that legitimizes the presence of the US maritime 
forces anywhere in the world.12
MAJOR ROLES OF NSMS 2005
To facilitates the U.S. naval forces to combat numerous threats including 
global terrorism; regional conflicts which might lead to the involvement of 
major powers; proliferation and smuggling of WMD and its related 
criminal acts.
To deter disruption to regional and global economies; marine 
transportation and commerce systems; attacks on critical maritime 
infrastructure and key assets; increased competition over nonliving marine 
resources; and transnational organized crimes; piracy; and transnational 
migration.  
Preemptive functions:  policing the global commons which means 
providing security to the world waterways; and protecting the maritime 
domains which refers to ensuring security at all ports as well as other 
related maritime facilities and key  infrastructures.
   
 
 
 
Graphic 2: Major roles of the NSMS 2005 
 
Energy Security Geopolitics 
NSMS 2005 is also linked to the energy security geopolitics of the US.  Ruhanie 
(2011:93) conceptualized energy security geopolitics as follows: 
 
Energy security geopolitics concerns the action of a state to control a particular region as a 
strategy to deter the possibility of an energy-based conflict which can affect the state’s 
access to energy resources; to avoid the state’s competitors from resorting to energy as a 
weapon to threaten its economic, political and national security; to ensure the safety to 
energy infrastructures and transportation routes; and to ensure that the global energy market 
is not disrupted.  
 
Ruhanie (ibid) also conceptualized energy security geopolitics of the US in 
Southeast Asia as follows: 
 
Energy security geopolitics of the US in Southeast Asia, therefore, is aimed at enabling the 
US to protect the security of petroleum transportation from West Asia---through the Straits 
of Malacca and the South China Sea---to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; to deter 
possibility of an energy conflict in the South China Sea; and to use the supply of petroleum 
                                                             
12 Since 2003, the United States government has been very active in developing maritime policy and 
assigning organizational responsibilities to provide maritime security (Egli anf Renuart 2003:1).   
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from West Asia as a possible weapon against its adversaries, particularly China, if and when 
necessary.   
 
The US is very particular about this aspect of geopolitics because it has been a net 
importer of energy since the 1950s; its dependence on imports has grown sharply since 
1985; oil accounts for 89 percent of net US energy imports; and the US energy 
consumption is projected to increase by about 32 percent by 2020 (The US National 
Energy Policy 2001).  At the same time, the US is also very focused on protecting its 
energy security geopolitics towards China since China’s net oil imports are expected to 
rise from approximately one million barrels of oil per day at present to possibly 5 to 8 
million barrels of oil per day by 2020, with a predominant (over 70 percent) dependence 
on Middle East imports (ibid).13
Energy security is now deemed so central to national security that threats to the former are 
liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter (ibid: 13 July 2008).
 
Additionally, the US energy security geopolitics is also linked to its national 
security.  Among the rationales are as follows:  
 
The possibility that access to energy resources may become an object of large-scale armed 
struggle is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system (Russell 21 
May 2008). 
 
14
                                                             
13 The concept of energy security came to refer to the quest of Western powers to secure the uninterrupted 
flow of oil from foreign suppliers, and the attempt to rationalize its use and diversify energy resources…  
At later stage, the concept of energy security was expanded into four directions, (i) to comprise all sources 
of energy, including oil, coal, nuclear, solar, and hydro energy so as to establish the ‘optimum’ mix of 
energy sources which best suits a nation’s needs, and most importantly the continuous access to that mix; 
(ii) to refer to the threats to national security resulting from energy including shortages; (iii) to deal with the 
strategies needed to establish an energy regime which does not pose a threat to the quality of the 
environment, and reduces the negative environmental consequences of energy production and 
consumption; and (iv) to assess the impact of the quest for secure sources of energy on the flare-up of 
conflicts, and the impact of conflict on securing sources of energy (Mohammad and Abdullah 2009:27). 
14 Energy security is the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices (Yergin 2006); and the 
provision of affordable, reliable, diverse and ample supplies of oil and gas and their future equivalents and 
adequate infrastructure to deliver these supplies to market (Kalicki and Goldwin (2005) in Fattouh 2007:5).  
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GEOPOLITICAL ELEMENTS OF NSMS 2005
NSMS 2005 is regarded as an 
instrument for the U.S. grand 
design geared toward containing 
and encircling its adversaries, 
especially in East Asia, and 
particularly China.
NSMS 2005 is about energy 
security of the U.S because “the 
vast majority of the world’s 
energy trade is sea borne,” and 
the U.S. “has been a net importer 
of energy since the 1950s, and 
U.S. dependence on imports has 
grown sharply since 1985.” 
NSMS 2005 is to pre-empt future 
resource war in sensitive regions 
of the world---the South China 
Sea and the Straits of Malacca. 
 
 
Graphic 3: Elements of geopolitics in NSMS 2005  
 
In summary, the US emphasizes on its energy security geopolitics15 because it is 
expected to experience a severe socio-economic crisis if it fails to secure adequate 
amount of imported oil and gas to meet its national consumption in the year 2020.  This is 
why the US has to choose the most appropriate and effective strategy to resolve its oil 
security dilemma in the 21st
                                                             
15 The geopolitics of energy arise out of the fact that most of the world’s principal energy producers are not 
its principal consumers.  For the energy producing countries, energy is not only a source of enormous 
power and wealth; it also constitutes leverage, since energy is a strategic resource whose denial to any rival 
or enemy increases the latter’s vulnerability. Energy can thus be used as a very effective weapon of war. 
Russia, for example, is successfully using energy as a very important geopolitical tool in its relations with 
the countries of its ‘near abroad’ as well as Europe (Sikri 2008:5).   
 
 century.  The most effective strategy in this context has to be 
in the form of a comprehensive and coordinated maritime security strategy coupled with 
a strong and reliable naval defense mechanism in order to protect the world’s sea lanes 
which are vital to the transportation of oil and gas from the producing countries---mostly 
in West Asia---to the American western shores and also to the US allies in East Asia.  In 
this case, NSMS 2005 is obviously the best strategy.  It enables the integrated US sea 
power to police the world’s waterways and its maritime domains.   
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Protect 
petroleum 
route
• To avoid disruption to 
supply which affects 
the economic, 
political and national 
security.
Deter 
energy 
war
• Especially in the 
Straits of Malaca and 
the South China Sea.
Use 
energy as 
weapon
• Against adversaries, 
particularly China, if 
and when necessary.
THE US ENERGY SECURITY 
GEOPOLITICS IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA
 
 
Graphic 4: The US energy security geopolitics in Southeast Asia 
 
Therefore, taking the above into consideration, it is appropriate to believe that 
another function of NSMS 2005 is to pre-empt a future resource war in sensitive regions 
of the world, especially in Southeast Asia, because the South China Sea is rich in natural 
resources such as oil and natural gas, but ownership of the resources is in dispute (US 
Energy Information Administration 2008:3).  There are numerous factors supporting this 
belief.  The most apparent is the current US military presence in Southeast Asia---in 
Basilan Island, Southern Philippines---through its counterterrorism initiative since 
January 2002.  Officially, it was unilaterally declared that the US had mobilized its 
military forces to Basilan Island to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group—a terrorist 
organization allegedly being the al-Qaeda’s proxy in Southeast Asia.  Implicitly, 
however, the presence of the US security forces in Southern Philippines is actually being 
perceived as a strategy to enhance the US sea power in Southeast Asia in order to 
strengthen the capability of its existing naval group already stationed in East Asia, in 
anticipation of a probable future resource war in the South China Sea.16
                                                             
16 The US’ strategy to preserve its permanent global superiority by preventing the rise of rivals drives US 
military objectives in the Philippines. The self-avowed aim of the US is to perpetuate its position of being 
the world’s sole superpower in order to re-order the world.  Its strategy to perpetuate its status is to prevent 
the rise of any rivals. To do this, it is seeking the capacity to deter and defeat potential enemies or rivals 
anywhere in the world by retaining and realigning its ‘global posture’ or its ability to operate across the 
globe through its worldwide network of forward-deployed troops, bases, and access agreements (Focus on 
the Philippines, November 2007). 
 
 
 
  The US 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 2007 indicted this probability by stating 
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that major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all 
have the potential to threaten US national security and world prosperity.  
In the context of Southeast Asian security environment, a regional conflict might 
erupt in the South China Sea if its littoral states, including China, fail to resolve their 
overlapping claims over this energy-rich region through effective conflict resolution 
mechanisms, peaceful negotiation, or diplomatic frameworks.  When such a conflict takes 
place, the possibility of a major power war in South China Sea is unavoidable.  And, the 
most possible non-Asian major power to be drawn into this regionalized conflict is none 
other but the US.   
Klare (2002) summed up the reason to a possible oil-conflict in the South China 
Sea, as follows: 
 
The growing demand for energy in Asia will affect the South China Sea in two significant 
ways.  First, the states that border on the area will undoubtedly seek to maximize their access 
to its undersea resources in order to diminish their reliance on imports.  Second, several 
other East Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, are vitally dependent on 
energy supplies located elsewhere, almost all of which must travel by ship through the South 
China Sea.  Those states will naturally seek to prevent any threat to the continued flow of 
resources.  Together, these factors have made the South China Sea the fulcrum of energy 
competition in Asia Pacific region.  So far, energy competition in the region has provoked 
only minor outbreaks of violence, in most cases involving clashes between the naval forces 
of neighboring states…The dispute over the South China Sea, however, is likely to grow 
more intense as the regional competition over vial energy supplies increases (Klare 
2002:111-113). 
 
The motive of the US in stationing its military personnel in Basilan Island is also 
reflected in an assessment of the US Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
2007 by Work and Jan van Tol (2008) as follows: 
 
Although the concept (the strategy) argues that maritime security is central to the success of 
globalization, it fails to acknowledge that the threats to the maritime commons are now 
likely as low as or lower than at any time in the last century.  Trade flows freely and 
unobstructed over the oceans.  Piracy remains a problem, but mainly to local shipping, 
fishermen, and coastal communities; it poses little threat to international trade and shipping.  
Terrorism at sea is also a relatively minor threat.  The lack of any general threat to maritime 
security is reflected in relatively low maritime insurance rates, except in a few localized 
areas.  The concept offers no evidence that this circumstance is likely to change in the future.  
This omission might lead some to conclude that the concept purposely hypes potential future 
threats to maritime security in a transparent attempt to justify a great increase in the size of 
maritime forces…. Given that a fierce competition for resources is looming, this argument is 
not likely to be persuasive unless backed up by evidence that threats to maritime security are 
on the rise (Work and Jan van Tol 2008:19-20).17
                                                             
17 By the end of third quarter 2008, the Southeast Asian region has recorded a total of 53 cases of piracy 
and armed robbery incidences for the year, one of the lowest recorded during the same period over the last 
five years. A total of 18 actual attacks were reported during the third quarter of 2008 (Southeast Asia 
Maritime Security Review 2008:1).  
 
 
  
 
The above observation is further clarified by Murphy (2007) as follows: 
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The number of terrorist attacks at sea has been minuscule as a proportion of terrorist attacks 
overall.  According to the RAND Corporation’s Terrorism Chronology Database and the 
RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, incidents of maritime terrorism account for only 
2 per cent of all the terrorism incidents recorded over the past 30 years.  This is because the 
conditions necessary for a successful terrorist attack can be fulfilled on water only with 
difficulty.  Terrorists have not operated at sea to any great extent so far because they can 
operate more easily and effectively on land. For the majority of terrorist groups operating 
today, maritime activity is unnecessary; there are only a few groups for whom operations are 
driven by strategic or operational imperative (Murphy 2007:45). 
 
As such, it is evident that NSMS 2005 is being designed to enhance the US 
geopolitics---particularly toward China---through mobilization of its integrated sea 
power, mostly to the Asia Pacific region to contain China, to enhance its energy security 
geopolitics, and to anticipate a resource war in the South China Sea. 
Despite of all the above, however, China is still unprovoked.  On the contrary, 
China is actively managing these security threats through its soft balancing mechanism.  
In addition, China introduces its new security concept in 2002 which reflected its aim to 
counterbalance the US.  According to Davison (2004:64) its emphasis are as follows: 
 
That the Asia-Pacific region and the world are moving inexorably towards multipolarity and 
that regional dialogue and cooperation are the best way to ensure peace and security. 
Smoothing relations with its immediate neighbors through border agreements and related 
confidence-building measures.  
Collaborating with Russia to counterbalance US international security postures related to 
arm control and peace enforcement. 
Implementing a regional diplomacy of ‘anti-hegemony’ designed to shape a regional 
security environment where US alliance system will no longer be relevant or necessary.  
 
The above security concept proves that China is against the hegemonic nature of 
the US foreign policy like the one being translated into the formulation of NSMS 2005.  
However, Erickson (2007) elaborated on the Chinese response to NSMS 2005 as follows: 
 
The key for the United States will be to attempt to convince China that the goals and 
intentions of the new strategy are real and not, as many in China fear, merely “window-
dressing” or a disguise for a “containment” of China (Erikson 2007:42). 
 
The observation by Erikson (2007) is reflective of China’s new security concept.  
It also proves that China as a major power which has amicable relations with most 
Southeast Asian nations is still not convinced about the true agenda of NSMS 2005.  
Until China is fully satisfied with the implicit and explicit objectives of NSMS 2005, it is 
safe to deduce that this new maritime strategy of the US is not the true and correct 
solution to the security uncertainties facing the US in the Post-911 era.        
 
 
The China Factor 
The hidden China Factor in the NSMS 2005, therefore, means that this maritime strategy 
is aimed at nothing else but geopolitics---the struggle between rival powers for control 
over territory, natural resources, vital geographic features (harbors, rivers, oases) and 
other sources of economic and military advantage (Klare 2004:147).  This is because the 
US---a lonely superpower in the Post-Cold War era; now trapped in a web of unipolarity 
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dilemmas, suffering from paradox of unchallenged supremacy, and predicted to face 
acute energy constraints by the year 2020---is construed to be using the NSMS 2005 as a 
strategic instrument to maintain its global supremacy and hegemony against rising China, 
as well as to strengthen its quasi-monopoly on the international energy trade of the 21st 
century.18
First, since the last decade of the 20
 This is the reality because maritime power is not based on navies alone, but 
also, as Alfred Thayer Mahan recognized, on economic strength, and the leading sea 
power is usually the leading economic power in the global system (Levy and Thompson 
2010:7).   
This is why NSMS 2005 is viewed with cynicism by some quarters in China, 
particularly the media, through remarks such as “had Washington not revised its maritime 
strategy to emphasize fighting nontraditional security challenges such as terrorism in 
keeping with world events, “the mighty US fleet [would] be like a giant that [had] lost its 
way, a colossus without any merit” (Erikson 2007:46).   
This remark might had not been made if the major agenda of NSMS 2005 is not 
perceived to be in line with offensive realism theory, i.e. to enable the US gain power 
over its rivals with hegemony as its final goal (Mearshiemer 2001:29); or being construed 
as in congruence with the objective of Project for the New American Century (PNAC) to 
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire 
(PNAC Statement of Principles 3:6:1997).  In other words, NSMS 2005 might had not be 
viewed negatively if it is not regarded by some quarters as an instrument for the US grand 
design geared toward containing and encircling its adversaries, especially in East Asia, 
and particularly China.  There are numerous factors to support this perception.  Among 
them are as follows:   
th century, there were consistent efforts to 
make the 21st century as the American century, especially in Asia.  This, for example, 
was clearly manifested in several reports and monographs prepared by PNAC and RAND 
Corporation.    Among other proposals, for example, the PNAC Report 2000 
recommended to the US government for the establishment of four core missions for the 
US military forces, including fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major 
theater wars; perform the constabulary duties associated with shaping the security 
environment in critical regions; and transform US forces to exploit the revolution in 
military affairs (PNAC Report 2000:iv).  Additionally, among the pre-requisites to the 
four missions include the repositioning of the US forces to respond to 21st century 
strategic realities by shifting permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and 
Southeast Asia; and by changing naval deployment patterns to reflect growing US 
strategic concerns in East Asia (Ibid).19
                                                             
18 There is now only one superpower. But this does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system 
would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers…A bipolar system like 
the Cold War has two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to international politics…A 
multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each 
other in shifting patterns…Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models 
(Huntington 1999: 35-36). The term unipolarity dilemmas is introduced by Ikenberry (2005), while the 
term unchallenged primacy is introduced by Joeff (2002:596).  
 
19 Washington has reconfigured its permanent troop deployments in Japan and South Korea, tightened its 
alliance with Australia, declared Thailand and the Philippines to be major non-NATO allies, and signed a 
wide-ranging strategic cooperation agreement with Singapore. Meanwhile, the Pentagon has deployed 
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These recommendations reflected elements of China containment strategy 
especially when it suggested the repositioning of the US permanently-based forces to 
Southeast Asia.  Therefore, it is not a sheer coincidence that the US implemented NSMS 
2005 in the first decade of the 21st
Second, deliberation about China Factor is also found in several official 
documents of the US which were formulated during the Bush Administration.  These 
documents could be considered as the originating sources for the formulation of NSMS 
2005.  In most of these documents, it is stated that the US is at war against the terrorists 
and potential adversaries that might jeopardize the US survival.  Within this context, 
China is one of the countries being singled out.  For example, President George W. Bush 
stated in the US National Security Strategy 2002, as follows: 
 century, although it is being considered by some 
American think-tanks as a principal protective element of the United States’ war on 
terrorism (Parfomak and Frittelli 20007:1).  It is because the PNAC Report which 
ultimately formed a major bulk of the US National Security Strategy 2002---hence the 
formulation of NSMS 2005---had already recommended the strategy of shifting 
permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia; and the changing of 
naval deployment patterns to reflect growing US strategic concerns in East Asia.  In this 
context, obviously no changing of naval deployment patterns could be carried out by the 
US without a comprehensive instrument of strategy to facilitate its implementation.  
NSMS 2005, therefore, is the most appropriate instrument for the execution of the 
strategy suggested by PNAC. 
 
America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both 
nations (China and Russia) because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and 
international order.  We will strongly resist aggression from other great powers---even as we 
welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, trade, and cultural advancement.   
     
Additionally, the US National Defense Strategy 2008 had singled out China as 
follows: 
 
China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the 
foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing military modernization 
and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security.  It is likely that China will 
continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area 
denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information 
warfare capabilities. Our interaction with China will be long-term and multi-dimensional and 
will involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded 
combat capabilities. The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term challenges while 
preserving and enhancing US national advantages over time (The US National Defense 
Strategy 2008:3). 
 
All the above manifested that China Factor does prevail in NSMS 2005.  Again, 
this proves that NSMS 2005 is a geopolitical instrument of the US which is being 
repackaged and repositioned through the label of global counterterrorism, particularly in 
21st
                                                                                                                                                                                     
significant new power-projection capabilities to the region, including attack submarines, cruise-missile 
destroyers, long-range bombers, and fighter aircraft stationed in Guam (Twining 2007:79). 
 century Southeast Asia.   
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Implications on Malaysia  
Therefore, if China is still not convinced that NSMS 2005 is a maritime security 
strategy being formulated for the sake of global peace, it is indicative that the geopolitical 
implications of NSMS 2005 might one day lead to US-China maritime-based armed 
conflicts in Southeast Asia.  This is due to the preemptive nature of NSMS 2005 which 
threatens the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of other nations and 
consequently motivates rivalry, provokes retaliations, and induces war.  In other words, 
NSMS 2005 is not a conflict avoidance strategy, but a strategy that could induce rivalry, 
conflict, and war. 
As such, if a conflict flares up in Southeast Asian region resulting from the 
preemptive nature of NSMS 2005, the impacts of such conflict on Malaysia and other 
Southeast Asian nations would undoubtedly be divisive---socially, politically, militarily, 
and economically---to the extent they might paralyzed the Southeast Asia nations and 
jeopardized the principles of peace, freedom, and neutrality which they advocated 
through ASEAN since in the early 1970s.   
As such, no matter how subtly the current rivalry is being manifested, 
uncertainties and anxieties are already in the air.  But, whether this rivalry would induce 
future armed conflicts, it is up to the Southeast Asian regional powers to collectively act 
and decide on how to mitigate the current security development in order to abort possible 
future war.  Southeast Asian nations, therefore, have to seriously view NSMS 2005 in the 
context of probable conflict and war in the region with outmost concern and 
preparedness.  It is such because US-China armed conflicts could erupt in Southeast Asia 
based on two scenarios.  But, in whichever scenario, the battle arena is still within 
Malaysian waters---the South China Sea in the east, and the Straits of Malacca in the 
west.  Although these waters are jointly owned by other littoral states, Malaysia could be 
the prime victim because of its close proximity to both waterways.  At the same time, it is 
because major maritime domains of Malaysia are situated along the Straits of Malacca, 
while Malaysia’s oil and gas fields are all in the South China Sea.   
The probable future war scenarios involving the US and China in Southeast Asia 
resulting from the preemptive nature of NSMS 2005 are as follows: 
1. A US-China armed conflict could erupt due to intensified rivalries among 
several Southeast nations over the control of energy-rich region of the South 
China Sea.  This conflict would ultimately force the US and China to take side 
with the opposing nations and being drawn into a much bigger war.  
Alternatively, this conflict could take place resulting from the unilateral action 
of the US to defend the interests of its East Asian allies in the event Chinese 
forces unilaterally and physically block vessels carrying oil and gas to South 
Korea, Taiwan and Japan from sailing through the South China Sea. 
 
2. A US-China maritime conflict could take place in the Straits of Malacca if the 
US naval forces unilaterally and physically control the Straits of Malacca and 
consequently prohibits all vessels carrying energy to China from passing 
through the straits.  Irrespective of the motives and implications, China would 
definitely construe such a blockade as a move by the US to disrupt China’s 
economy.  In such a situation, China would inevitably retaliate through an 
armed aggression toward the US.  This scenario is possible because imported 
The US National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005 and Its Geopolitical Implications on Malaysia 
 
Jebat  Volume 38 (2011) Page | 49  
energy is the lifeline of China’s economic growth.  Alternatively, this scenario 
could also happen in the Straits of Malacca if China, on the other hand, 
unilaterally takes physical control of the straits to block the passage of energy-
laden tankers sailing to South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or the western shores of 
the US.20
The above scenarios are indications that the geopolitical element and the 
preemptive nature of NSMS 2005 undoubtedly have its impacts and implications on 
Malaysia and other nations of Southeast Asia. The most directly affected countries are 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore as the major littoral states to the Straits of Malacca 
and the Singapore Straits; as well as Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam as the littoral states to the South China Sea.
   
21
1. If an inter-conflict among the Southeast Asian nations takes place in the South 
China Sea, ASEAN solidarity will definitely vanish into the thin air.  In such a 
situation, the foreign policy configuration of each individual Southeast Asian 
nation would be in disarray.
  Papua New 
Guinea, Timor Leste, Kampuchea, Laos, and Myanmar are indirectly affected due to the 
fact that they also have maritime domains as being defined in NSMS 2005. 
In this context, the major impacts of NSMS 2005 are related to the issues of 
ASEAN solidarity; the foreign policy configuration of Southeast Asian nations; their 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty; as well as their collective ability to 
formulate collective multilateral strategies toward the US and China.  All these issues are 
interrelated.  But, the most critical of all are about the ASEAN solidarity and the foreign 
policy configuration of Southeast Asian nations toward the US and China.  These issues 
are the keys to resolving the other two.  They are delicate and divisive due to the 
following reasons. 
22  Some nations would be fighting together with the 
US, some others would be fighting with China, and a few of them might choose to 
remain neutral but being caught in the middle of an inter-ASEAN war involving 
two world great powers.  In such a scenario, balancing, bandwagoning or even 
hedging the security threats would be of no benefit to the ASEAN solidarity.23
                                                             
20 A high dependence on the Malacca Straits leaves China vulnerable not only to threats of piracy and 
terrorism, but also to other powerful competitor nations, including the United States, Japan and India, who 
seek control of these sea lines and who are taking action accordingly (Zhang 2007:19). 
21 Concern about shipping lanes in Southeast Asia is greatly exacerbated in the South China Sea by an 
additional factor---the reserves of oil close to the Spratly Island, which are thought to provide a serious risk 
of armed conflict (Dosch 2004:131). 
22 For Southeast Asia, there is a consensus among analysts that the subregion has adopted a twin strategy of 
deep engagement with China on the one hand and, on the other, “soft balancing” against potential Chinese 
aggression or disruption of the status quo. The latter strategy includes not only military acquisitions and 
modernization but also attempts to keep the United States involved in the region as a counterweight to 
Chinese power (Goh 2005:vii). 
 
23 Notwithstanding the intention to redeploy forces from Asia, the United States has been upgrading its 
defense relations with key partners in the region. In Southeast Asia, apart from U.S. treaty allies Thailand 
and the Philippines, U.S. security relations have strengthened with Singapore and, more recently, 
Indonesia. Since September 11, quiet cooperation with Malaysia has improved, and normalization with 
Vietnam has enabled Washington and Hanoi to establish cautious and incremental military-to-military ties. 
Two conditions probably account for this adjustment. First, the war against terrorism has made it 
imperative for the United States to forge closer ties with the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia. 
Second, this broadening of security relations creates structural constraints to discourage Beijing from 
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2. In the event of US-China armed conflict in defense of the US allies in East Asia, 
or in defense of the US and China individual interests either in the Straits of 
Malacca or the South China Sea, the same divisive scenario would again become 
inevitable.  This is because Southeast Asian nations have varied foreign policy 
perspective toward the US and China.  Thailand and the Philippines are the treaty 
allies of the US    Singapore has special defense agreements with the US  
Indonesia has a unique military and defense arrangement with the US  Malaysia 
as the Southeast Asian pioneer in establishing diplomatic relations with China in 
the Cold War Era, also has the US as its biggest trading partner.  Vietnam, Laos 
and Kampuchea are advocates of socialism.  Brunei is a monarchy.   Papua New 
Guinea and Timor Leste are young nations with lesser diplomatic clout.  
Myanmar is ruled by a military regime unfriendly with the US. 
3. Third, the foreign policy configuration of Southeast Asian nations also varies due 
to the US war on terror in which Muslim terrorist organizations, including those 
allegedly operating in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Southern Philippines and 
Southern Thailand, are supposedly to be the principal enemy.  This factor 
becomes one of the divisive elements in the foreign policy configuration of 
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia if maritime-based conflicts between the US 
and China occur in Southeast Asia.  This, however, is not due to the fact that the 
governments of Indonesia and Malaysia are in favor of terrorism.  Conversely, 
this is due to the fact that majority of Muslims in these countries might pressure 
their respective government to be against the US just as an expression of their 
hatred toward the US for waging the terror war which is being perceived as an 
unjust and unnecessary war. 
The diverse foreign policy configuration of the Southeast Asian nations, 
therefore, is the major obstacle for them to maintain the ASEAN solidarity and 
hence to have a standard and unified stand toward the US and China in the event 
of maritime-based regional conflicts involving the two great powers due to their 
intensified geopolitical rivalry.  As such, if all Southeast nations fail to overcome 
this obstacle, Southeast Asia will definitely be divided in the event that NSMS 
2005 causes the US-China conflicts in the future.  Some nations---without 
hesitation---will sail along with the U.S; some others---also without hesitation---
will align fully with China; while a minority few will be caught in a dilemma, 
whether to become a last-minute ally, to bandwagon, or just do hedging with 
either the US or China.  This failure will also hinder the Southeast Asia nations 
from taking a collective stand on how to defend their territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty if the rivalries between the US and China erupt into a war.   
 
It is now clear that NSMS 2005 does have its impacts and implications on 
Malaysia and other Southeast Asian nations if US-China conflicts take place in the region 
in the coming decades.  Based on the two scenarios discussed earlier, the biggest impact 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
abusing its growing regional power. In recent years there has been a gradual and quiet multilateralization of 
security cooperation in the region. Once bilateral exercises between the United States and Thailand, the 
annual Cobra Gold maneuvers have been enlarged to include Singapore and Japan as formal partners, and 
several other nations as observers (The Stanley Foundation 2006:6).  
 
The US National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005 and Its Geopolitical Implications on Malaysia 
 
Jebat  Volume 38 (2011) Page | 51  
of NSMS 2005 on Malaysia is on the question of how Malaysia will act in solitary to 
decide on its fate and survival in the context of its relations with the US and China.  This 
challenge is the most difficult and the most crucial at the bilateral and multilateral levels.  
The only option left is for Malaysia to act preemptively through its own national 
initiative.  More specifically, Malaysia has to embark on this preemptive initiative right 
from now to mitigate the possibility of such conflicts. 
This article has the following insights for the Malaysian government to consider.  
They are as follows: 
1. The first area to be reviewed by the Malaysia government is about the status of its 
overlapping claims in the South China Sea since this is one of the flash points 
where a conflict could take place.  In this context, thorough studies on all possible 
triggering factors need to be carried out. This should be followed by exploring all 
possible conflict avoidance strategies in order to mitigate the conflict through 
diplomacy, legal measures, or horse trading based on a win-win principle.24
2. The second area of focus is Malaysia’s maritime strategy and policy as well as its 
defense capability, especially in the naval and air defense sectors.  At the same 
time, Malaysia has to review its national security strategy, its national defense 
policy, as well as its national security and national defense apparatuses.  This is 
vital due to the fact that the anticipated US-China conflicts are maritime-based 
conflicts either in the South China Sea and/or in the Straits of Malacca. 
  
3. The third area of focus will be on Malaysia’s maritime domains and Malaysia key 
maritime infrastructures based on their definitions in NSMS 2005.  This will 
enable Malaysia to ascertain the adequacy of its security measures concerning 
maritime domains and maritime key infrastructures, as well to enhance these 
measures in order to avoid any preemptive move by the US naval power should 
the US finds that Malaysia’s maritime domains and key maritime infrastructures 
are detrimental to the US vital interests and the American citizens or that of its 
allies.  
4. The fourth focus should be on Malaysia’s multilateral cooperation in providing 
security and safety in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, including 
the current ASEAN version of Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) with 
several Southeast Asian nations and Japan.    In this context, Malaysia has to 
initiate on the possibility of persuading the ASEAN RMSI partners to include 
China into this framework.  Malaysia also has to review international observations 
and opinions regarding China’s participation in RMSI.  One example of these 
observations is by Sato (2004) as follows: 
Since its foundation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has emphasized regional solidarity and the exclusion of outside influences 
from the region. While this was not practical at the time of the Cold War and 
hot wars in Vietnam and Cambodia, when the socialist/communist states of 
                                                             
24 The Spratlys disputes are Malaysia’s most complex territorial disputes in the South China Sea…  
Specifically, China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim the whole of the Spratly Islands while Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Brunei claim only parts thereof. A good example is Amboyna Cay.  It is simultaneously 
claimed by China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam (Asri et. al 2009:111). 
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Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar joined ASEAN in the late 1990s the 
organization had an opportunity to revisit these objectives.  On maritime-
security issues, the desire to exclude outside influences is most closely 
shared by Malaysia and Indonesia, the two countries that view actions in the 
Straits as a sovereign issue. Singapore's increasing cooperation with the 
United States, such as preparation for port calls by US aircraft carriers, is a 
divergence from the policies of the other two countries. This stems from 
Singapore's greater emphasis on Straits security as a national strategic 
interest; the other two countries have broader sets of security priorities. Fear 
of its bigger Muslim neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, is often cited as a 
reason for Singapore's flirtations with outside powers. Though this may be 
true, Singapore also argues that Indonesian and Malaysian maritime-security 
shortcomings are the real concern and that the call for US and Japanese help 
is intended to be a wake-up call.  Southeast Asian countries also view China's 
rising naval power with caution. For this reason, their attitude toward the US 
presence in the region is ambiguous. Despite vocal opposition to permanent 
basing by the US fleet, a less visible presence, such as bilateral assistance 
from and joint training with US forces that upgrade local military 
capabilities, is welcomed by both Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia has 
participated in joint naval exercises with the United States. And Indonesia's 
lack of participation is not the result of its reluctance, but of US sanctions 
imposed after human-rights violations were committed by the Indonesian 
military in East Timor….Nevertheless, the three ASEAN countries are not 
interested in antagonizing China over enhanced cooperation with the US and 
Japan. China is recognized as an important mediator that can be engaged and 
used to deter other superpowers. China has been invited to major regional 
anti-terrorism meetings along with the US and Japan (Sato July 14, 2004).  
The most pertinent point raised by Sato (2004) is regarding Malaysia’s stand on 
the sovereignty of the Straits of Malacca.  As such, Malaysia has to evaluate this 
question in the context of the bigger picture i.e. mitigating the possible US-China 
conflicts.   And, the most crucial consideration to this issue is whether the 
inclusion of China into the Southeast Asian RMSI will jeopardize Malaysia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity over the Straits of Malacca and the South 
China Sea.  Such evaluation will enable Malaysia to envisage the appropriate 
multilateral ASEAN strategy regarding RMSI within the framework of NSMS 
2005 and to mitigate the possible future conflicts involving the US and China in 
Southeast Asian waters. 
5. Consequently, therefore, the fifth area of focus is about reviewing and analyzing 
the maritime strategies and policies of the US and China and ascertaining the 
maritime capabilities of both countries to enable Malaysia envision the most 
appropriate contingency strategy should these two great powers collide in the 
Straits of Malacca or the South China Sea to safeguard their geostrategic interests 
in these waterways.  
All these mitigating strategies are essential in order to enable Malaysia has 
balanced relations with the US and China in the 21st century, to enable Malaysia 
formulates its national contingency strategies, and to facilitate Malaysia’s role in ASEAN 
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and other regional organizations in the context of mitigating the probable US-China 
conflicts in future.  
However, despite of all the above, Ruhanie (2011:91) has quoted Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister, Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Razak, as stating that Malaysia preferred multilateral 
approach to overcome any possible US-China conflicts in the Straits of Malacca or the 
South China Sea.  Ruhanie (ibid) quoted Dato’ Sri Najib as follows: 
 
The formation of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM) in 2010, involving 
10 members of ASEAN and their dialogue partners---the US, Australia, China, Japan, India, 
South Korea, New Zealand and Russia---is aimed at ensuring that ASEAN remains free from 
major powers’ influences and able to become the central player in determining its actions, 
whether politically, economically or socially.    
 
Regarding the US energy security geopolitics in Southeast Asia, Dato’ Sri Najib 
was quoted by Ruhanie (2011:97) as follows: 
 
The responsibility to protect the maritime security and the safety of passage in the Straits of 
Malacca and the South China Sea lies with the littoral states.  This is because they are related 
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral states.  On the part of Malaysia, it 
has implemented a comprehensive maritime security policy to ensure the safety and security 
in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. 
It is clear therefore, while Malaysia is not unaware of the US grand strategy on 
China and the US energy security geopolitics involving the Straits of Malacca and the 
South China Sea, Malaysia still prefers to approach both of these issues through 
diplomacy and multilateralism, especially through ASEAN.  By taking this approaches, 
however, Malaysia definitely and indirectly hopes that all major powers, especially the 
US and China, also have to share their responsibilities in maintaining a positive and 
conducive security environment in Southeast Asia. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this article discovers that maritime security concept has never been 
clearly defined.  But its scope has been widened by the various US security authorities in 
the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy through the formulation of NSMS 2005 which is meant to 
provide security to the global commons, maritime domains and key maritime 
infrastructures.  However, the US NSMS 2005 has two preemptive functions i.e. policing 
the global commons and maritime domains in the context of providing security to 
American citizens, vital interests and key assets in the event they are facing maritime 
security threats.  These functions are detrimental to the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of other nations. This is why NSMS 2005, irrespective of its explicit 
objective, is still being construed by certain quarters in China, especially the media, as an 
instrument of the US foreign policy with imperialistic motives.  
This article also has ascertained that NSMS 2005 bears several elements of 
geopolitics, specifically pertaining to the containment of China, concerning the 
enhancement of the US energy security geopolitics, and the US naval power’s 
preparations for possible maritime conflicts in the energy-rich regions of Southeast Asia, 
particularly in the South China Sea, and in the critical waterway of the Straits of Malacca 
which is vital to the transportation of energy to China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and 
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even the west coast of the US.  In connection to these geopolitical elements of NSMS 
2005, this article analyses two hypothetical war scenarios in the South China Sea and the 
Straits of Malacca and their impacts on Southeast Asian nations, particularly Malaysia.  
Realizing the divisive impacts of such conflicts, this analysis provides several insights to 
the Malaysian government on how to mitigate the probable conflicts right from now in 
order to abort the possible conflicts from becoming realities in the future decades.  These 
suggestions are to enable Malaysia reconfigures its relations with the US and China 
through bilateral and multilateral initiatives in order to have balanced relations with the 
two major powers, as well as to enable Malaysia plays key roles in mitigating the 
probable conflicts through the ASEAN framework and other multilateral organizations---
regionally and internationally. 
Lastly, although this article acknowledges the noble intention of the US in 
formulating and implementing NSMS 2005, it has, however, its strong reservation on the 
preemptive functions of NSMS 2005 which are perceived to be detrimental to the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations because these functions could 
motivate rivalry, provoke retaliations, and induce war, especially in Southeast Asia where 
the principles of peace, freedom, and neutrality are the beacon of world peace being 
advocated since early 1970s. 
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